To Catch a Thief: The Misappropriation Theory and Securities Fraud by Finigan, Barbara J.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 70
Issue 4 Summer 1987 Article 6
To Catch a Thief: The Misappropriation Theory
and Securities Fraud
Barbara J. Finigan
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Barbara J. Finigan, To Catch a Thief: The Misappropriation Theory and Securities Fraud, 70 Marq. L. Rev. 692 (1987).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol70/iss4/6




The term "insider trading" describes the illegal use of con-
fidential, material' information by an individual for personal
profit in the stock market. This illegal use of information con-
stitutes a form of fraud which has become a widespread prob-
lem in the securities market in recent years.2 Available
evidence indicates that insider trading is the most common
violation of the federal securities laws.3
Insider trading is a destructive act which threatens eco-
nomic growth and stability in the nation's capital markets by
undermining investor confidence.4 Not only is the illegal act a
deprivation of investors' fair value of their investments, but it
is unethical and unfair.5 Trading on the basis of confidential,
material information has a detrimental impact on the securi-
ties market. Accordingly, the anti-fraud provisions of the fed-
eral securities laws have been construed to proscribe, in
certain instances, such trading.
1. Material information is information that a reasonable investor would consider
important in making an investment decision. Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848-49 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
2. Although the problem of insider trading is not new, in recent years the extent of
this type of securities fraud has become more apparent. A primary reason for the dra-
matic rise in the incidences of insider trading has been an increase in the number of
merger and tender offers which lead to immediate and dramatic price movements in the
stock of the target corporation. Insiders trading on confidential, material information
reap enormous profits if the underlying stock increases in value as a result of a tender
offer announcement or other news. See 130 CONG. REC. H7759 (daily ed. July 25,
1984) (statement of Rep. Wirth) [hereinafter CONG. REC.].
3. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1, 6 n. 17
(1980). In addition to the fact that the practice of insider trading itself seems to incur
relatively modest costs, the business community views insider trading as reprehensible
only under very special circumstances. Id.
4. Although a small number of free-market economists suggest that insider trading
harms no one and is an effective means of rewarding entrepreneurs, see, e.g., H.
MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); Manne, In Defense of
Insider Trading, 44 HARV. Bus. REV. 113 (Nov.-Dec. 1966), this argument is not
widely accepted. See, e.g., Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne. Insider
Trading and the Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REV. 1425 (1967); Longstreth, Halting Insider
Trading, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1984, at A27, col. I.
5. See Longstreth, supra note 4, at A27, col. I.
THE MISAPPR OPRIA TION THEORY
The scope of the prohibition against insider trading has
been determined by judicial and administrative construction
of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19346 (the
Act). Initially, the prohibition was broadly construed to pre-
vent incidences of insider trading. However, in 1980 the
United States Supreme Court restricted the reach of the anti-
fraud provisions of the Act with respect to insider trading.7
According to the Supreme Court's recent articulation, an in-
sider with confidential, material information is under no duty
to disclose the information or refrain from trading unless
there is a relationship of trust and confidence between parties
involved in the transaction.8 Absent such a relationship, a
person with inside information may profit from the use of
such information in securities transactions.
The Supreme Court's recent restriction on the scope of the
prohibition of insider trading directly conflicts with the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) current increase in
enforcement and criminal proceedings against individuals ille-
gally using confidential, material information.9 As a response
to the Supreme Court's frustration of its attempt to prohibit
insider trading, the SEC has responded with novel theories for
actionable violations of the securities laws. 10 The most con-
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). The pertinent portion of § 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facil-
ity of any national securities exchange:
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropri-
ate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
7. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
8. Id. at 230. For purposes of this Comment, a relationship of trust and confidence
is considered a fiduciary relationship.
9. The recent years have seen a sharp increase in the number of insider trading
cases. Twenty insider trading cases were initiated in 1985, thirty in 1986, and more are
expected in 1987. Special Report, 19 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 102 (Jan. 16, 1987).
10. Painter, How to Control Insider Trading, 73 A.B.A. J. 38 (Mar. 1, 1987).
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troversial new theory put forth by the SEC is what has been
deemed the "misappropriation theory.""
In essence, the theory asserts that anyone who misappro-
priates information from an employer, or another source, and
trades on the basis of that information is violating the anti-
fraud provisions of the Act. The theory circumvents the re-
quirements of a fiduciary relationship between the parties to a
transaction by finding fraud in the improper procurement of
inside information.
This theory has been embraced by the SEC in its enforce-
ment and criminal proceedings,1 2 and has received support in
federal appellate courts. It is unknown whether the Supreme
Court will sustain a version of the misappropriation theory,13
however, the theory is currently being reviewed by the
Court.' 4 Absent a firm endorsement of the theory from the
Supreme Court, the SEC will be divested of yet another tool it
can utilize in its increasing efforts to prevent fraud in the se-
curities market.' 5
The first part of this Comment discusses the development
of the prohibition against insider trading under the federal se-
curities laws. This Comment then specifically focuses on the
11. The term "misappropriation theory" had its genesis in Chiarella, 445 U.S. at
222. See infra notes 84-140 and accompanying text for an outline of the development of
the theory.
12. This Comment will discuss the misappropriation theory and its application in
enforcement and in criminal proceedings. The applicability of the theory to private
actions for damages under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 is beyond the scope of this Comment.
13. This Comment proposes a version of the theory consistent with the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals' version put forth in United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12
(2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983) as the appropriate standard for liability
under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. See infra notes 103-18 and accompanying text. An al-
ternative "absolute duty" version was put forth by Chief Justice Warren Burger in
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 243-45 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See infra notes 85-89 and ac-
companying text. Two other commentators have put forth versions of a misappropria-
tion theory which have yet to be fully adopted by a court. See Brudney, Insiders,
Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 322 (1979); Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules
Against Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9 (1984).
14. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), affg sub nom.
United States v. Winans, 612 F. Supp. 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct.
666 (Dec. 15, 1986).
15. In an effort to increase its prevention efforts against insider trading, the SEC
has started a trend towards criminalizing federal securities laws. See Criminal Prosecu-
tions Insider Trading Questions Are Probed by Panelists at ABA, 18 SEC. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA) 1202 (Aug. 15, 1986).
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development of the misappropriation theory, presenting its
different versions and applications in recent cases. Next, the
substantive merits of the theory are critiqued and the policy
supporting an adoption of the misappropriation theory are put
forth. Finally, this Comment concludes with an assertion that
the misappropriation theory is a proper standard for finding
securities fraud, and therefore is worthy of endorsement by
the Supreme Court.
II. PROHIBITION OF INSIDER TRADING
A. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in
response to unethical trading practices which contributed to
the Stock Market Crash of 1929.16 The Act was designed pri-
marily as a mechanism to regulate sales and purchases of se-
curities, 17 and to protect investors against manipulation and
deception in the stock market."8
Two provisions of the Act place insider trading within its
domain:19 section 16(b) and, as it evolved, section 10(b). Sec-
tion 16(b) applies only to limited types of transactions,
presents a narrow description of insiders, and does not grant
the SEC authority to enforce liability thereunder.2 ° Section
10(b), however, is a general anti-fraud provision which has de-
veloped into a broad and far-reaching statute with respect to
insider trading.21
1. Section 10(b)
Under section 10(b), the SEC was vested with general reg-
ulatory powers over securities transactions. The SEC gained
16. See Brudney, supra note 13, at 334-35 in which the author states, "[t]here is no
doubt that Congress believed that a system of disclosure was the minimum necessary
nostrum for [restoring trust in the securities markets] after the market disasters of 1929
and 1930 ..... Id. See also Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Capital Gains Bureau, 375
U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
17. 78 CONG. REC. § 2271 (1934).
18. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194-214 (1976) for an extensive
analysis of the language and history of § 10(b).
19. R. POSNER & K. ScoTr, EcONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIES
REGULATION 118 (1980).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
21. See supra note 6.
1987]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
express authority to proscribe rules necessary and appropriate
in the public interest to prohibit any manipulative or deceptive
device utilized by any person in relation to securities
transactions.22
Nothing in the language of section 10(b) defines or prohib-
its insider trading.23 Rather, the loose language of the statute
presents the SEC with the opportunity to use its broad power
to inhibit incidences of fraud and deceit, leaving precise defini-
tions of the substantive elements of a section 10(b) violation
up to judicial interpretation.24 Unfortunately, the ambiguous
language of the statute and reliance on judicial construction
has failed to produce consistent and definite rules regarding
insider trading.25
2. The Purpose of Section 10(b)
Although the legislative history of section 10(b) is "bereft
of any explicit explanation of Congress' intent ,...26 section
10(b) and the rules promulgated thereunder have been consid-
ered "catchalls" to prohibit any cunning device used to ma-
nipulate the market itself for personal gain.27 Since its initial
enactment, the basic goals of the provision have been "[t]o
provide fair and honest mechanisms for the pricing of securi-
22. Id.
23. There has been considerable debate over the issue of whether Congress should
legislate specific rules defining exactly what are the clear boundaries of acceptable con-
duct for insider trading. Congress recently opted for leaving the definitions of insider
trading to the evolving case law in the area. See CONG. REC., supra note 2. The SEC is
in favor of keeping the definitions of insider trading vague. See Williams, "What's
Legal-And What's Not," FORTUNE Dec. 22, 1986, at 36.
24. Congress left to the courts the difficult task of interpretating legislatively de-
fined but broadly stated principles insofar as they apply in particular cases. United
States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1027 (2d Cir. 1986) aff'g sub nom. United States v.
Winans, 612 F. Supp. 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 666 (Dec. 15,
1986).
25. The current scheme prohibiting insider trading has been "'noisy, random, slow-
moving, and vague, thus resulting in a lack of sufficient deterrence." Branson, Discourse
on the Supreme Court Approach to SEC Rule lOb-5 and Insider Trading, 30 EMORY L.
J. 263, 301 (1981).
26. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976) (opinion asserts that the
legislative history of the Act gives no direct guidance as to the scope of § 10(b)).
27. The "catchall" verbiage is often used by courts reviewing the purpose of § 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 766
(1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 801 (5th Cir.
1970); Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 859 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
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ties, to assure that dealing in securities is fair and without un-
due preferences or advantages among investors . .. and to
provide, to the maximum degree practicable, markets that are
open and orderly. 28
B. SEC Rule lOb-5
In 1942, the SEC utilized its rule-making power granted
by section 10(b) to promulgate Rule 10b-5. 29 Like section 10
(b), Rule lOb-5 does not define or specifically prohibit insider
trading. Rather, the Rule proscribes any person from making
"affirmative misrepresentations, half-truths or omissions in
connection with a purchase or sale of securities. ' 30 Despite its
modest beginnings, 31 the Rule has developed into the primary
tool utilized by the SEC to combat fraud in the securities
market.32
In terms of the insider trading prohibition under Rule 10b-
5, the original drafters expressed the view that the legal doc-
trine be inventive and result-oriented; flexible enough to reach
a broad range of abuses and encourage fair play in the securi-
ties market.33 Rule lOb-5, along with the anti-fraud provi-
sions of the Act, were designed to remove the philosophy of
28. These objectives were reiterated by Congress when it amended the Act in 1975.
See sec. Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 179, 322-23.
29. 17 C.F.R. § 240, lOb-5. Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facil-
ity of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
30. Note, An Outsider Who Misappropriates Confidential Information May Be
Charged With Securities Fraud: United States v. Newman, 31 DE PAUL L. REV. 849,
850 (1982).
31. R. HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 877 (1986).
32. "Rule lOb-5 has since become an important policing device in controlling insid-
ers trading on the basis of nonpublic information." H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES
LAW HANDBOOK 349 (1986-87).
33. Langevoort, The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and Its Effect on Ex-
isting Law, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1273, 1279 (1984).
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caveat emptor and to replace it with a philosophy of disclosure
in order to promote fairness and equity in securities
transactions.3
4
The early applications of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 re-
sulted in an expansive interpretation of the anti-fraud provi-
sions. Rule lOb-5 was applied to many types of transactions,
while the doctrines which would have limited the scope of lia-
bility under Rule lOb-5 were continuously rejected.35 It was
not until recently that the Supreme Court narrowed the scope
of Rule lOb-5 despite the fact that the SEC had increased its
insider trading enforcement and criminal proceedings, 36 and
that Congress had passed legislation imposing severe penalties
for incidences of insider trading.37
C. Development of Rule lOb-5 Liability
1. Early Applications: Common Law Principles
In order for Rule lOb-5 to apply to a suspect transaction,
there must be fraud. 38 In order for fraud to be based on non-
disclosure, there must be an obligation to disclose. 39 There-
fore, the crucial question in the initial interpretation of Rule
lOb-5 was at what point the obligation, or duty, to disclose
arises.
The early cases involving Rule lOb-5 utilized the common
law approach to fraud and found that a duty to disclose arises
when a relationship of trust and confidence was established
between the parties to a transaction.40 Absent a fiduciary rela-
tionship between the transacting parties, trading without dis-
34. Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Capital Gains Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
35. R. HAMILTON, supra note 31.
36. See Special Report, supra note 9.
37. Securities Exchange Act § 21(d)(2), was added by The Insider Trading Sanc-
tions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984). The Act created an addi-
tional remedy that the SEC may seek in insider trading cases, up to three times the
profit gained or loss avoided as a result of such unlawful purchase or sale. Id.
38. See Note, Federal Securities Regulation - Rule lOb-5 - Misappropriation of Con-
fidential Takeover Information From an Investment Banking Firm and Its Clients for the
Purpose of Purchasing Shares of the Target Companies Constitutes a Criminal Violation
of Rule 10b-5, 27 VILL. L. REv. 1329, 1333 n.22 (1981-82) for an outline of the com-
mon law tort action of fraud and its application to securities fraud.
39. See Note, Insider Trading - The Extension of The Duty to Disclose Material
Insider Information, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 132-41 (1982) for a discussion of the
development of the duty to disclose under Rule lob-5.
40. See generally Note, supra note 30, at 852-55.
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closing material, nonpublic information was not fraud, and
therefore, not an actionable violation of the securities laws.
The most significant flaw in the common law approach to
Rule 10b-5 liability was that it failed to recognize silence as a
fraudulent act.4'
2. In re Cady, Roberts & Co. - Inherent Unfairness
The first statement that trading on nonpublic, material in-
formation without disclosure constituted a violation of Rule
lOb-5 was asserted in In re Cady, Roberts & Co.,42 a 1961 ad-
ministrative proceeding. In Cady, Roberts, a director of a cor-
poration informed his broker-partner during a recess of the
corporation's directors meeting that the corporation intended
to reduce its stock dividends.43 The broker used this material
information to his advantage by selling thousands of shares in
the open market prior to the announcement of the dividend
reduction.' The broker's trading was found to be a violation
of Rule lOb-5.45
Noting that the anti-fraud provisions are phrased in terms
of any person,46 the Cady, Roberts court reasoned that the
broker's obligation to disclose arose because material facts
were known to him by virtue of his position, and not known
by the party with whom he dealt.47 The court rejected the
argument that an obligation to disclose applied only to tradi-
tional corporate insiders.48
The Cady, Roberts court found that a duty to disclose
under Rule lOb-5 arises when two elements are present:
41. Id. at 854.
42. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
43. Id. at 909.
44. Id. In total 7,000 shares were sold. Id. After the reduction was made public,
the shares dropped over six points in value during the day. Id. at 909-10.
45. Id. at 911. In addition to § 10(b) claims, the SEC found the activities of the
defendants violative of § 17(a) of the Act. Id.
46. Id. The SEC stated "[t]hese antifraud provisions are not intended as a specifica-
tion of particular acts or practices which constitute fraud, but rather are designed to
encompass the infinite variety of devices by which undue advantage may be taken of
investors and others." Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 912. Corporate insiders are traditionally considered to be officers, direc-
tors and controlling shareholders. But as the SEC has stated, "[t]hese three groups...
do not exhaust the classes of persons upon whom there is such an obligation." Id.
1987]
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[F]irst, the existence of a relationship giving access, di-
rectly or indirectly, to information intended to be available
only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit
of anyone and second, the inherent unfairness involved
where a party takes advantage of such information knowing
it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.49
The impact of the Cady, Roberts decision was to present
courts with a flexible test to expand the class of persons sub-
ject to the insider trading prohibition under section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5.50 After Cady, Roberts courts no longer relied
solely on the common law concept of fraud to interpret the
substantive elements of a section 10(b) violation, but rather
looked for a relationship giving rise to a duty to disclose,51
coupled with inherent unfairness in the transaction. 2
3. Securities & Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co. - Equal Access to Information
The expansion of the scope of Rule lOb-5 which began in
Cady, Roberts culminated with the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals' landmark decision of Securities & Exchange Com-
mission v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.5 3 in 1968. The Texas Gulf
Sulphur decision premised the duty to disclose confidential,
material information on the mere possession of such informa-
tion and in doing so shifted the focus of Rule lOb-5 liability
away from a special relationship between the parties to a
transaction."
In Texas Gulf Sulphur, corporate officers and directors
purchased a large block of stock in their corporation without
disclosing their knowledge of the corporation's successful
49. Id. In putting forth such an analytical test the SEC opined, "[olur task here is
to identify those persons who are in a special relationship with a company and privy to
its internal affairs, and thereby suffer correlative duties in trading in its securities. Inti-
macy demands restraint lest the uninformed be exploited." Id.
50. Comment, Outsider Trading After Dirks v. SEC, 18 GA. L. REV. 593, 600
(1984).
51. Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912.
52. Id.
53. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.1968).
54. See Farley, A Current Look at the Law of Insider Trading, 39 Bus. LAW. 1771.
1773 (1984) (emphasis added). The Texas Gulf Sulphur decision "clearly changed the
character of the analysis from an inquiry into the fiduciary duties to one premised on
the notion that all investors trade equally and none should have an informational ad-
vantage over the other." Id.
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mineral strike to the selling shareholders.5 5 After the news of
the strike was made public, the officers and directors sold their
stock at the elevated market prices and realized substantial
gains. 6 These activities were held to be violative of section 10
(b) and Rule lOb-5. 7
The Texas Gulf Sulphur court focused almost exclusively
on the fairness element put forth in the two-prong test of
Cady, Roberts58 and interpreted Rule lOb-5 as follows:
[A]nyone who, trading for his own account in the securities
of a corporation has "access, directly or indirectly, to infor-
mation intended to be available only for a corporate purpose
and not for the personal benefit of anyone" may not take
"advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to
those with whom he is dealing ....
The court further asserted that Rule lOb-5 liability was based
on a policy of all investors having "relatively equal access to
material information." 60 The Texas Gulf Sulphur opinion has
been construed as extending a duty to disclose beyond an in-
sider in a fiduciary relationship to anyone possessing material
information.61
The approach giving rise to liability under Rule lOb-5 in
Texas Gulf Sulphur obviously created a far more expansive
result than the approach developed in Cady, Roberts. The
two decisions illustrate the divergent philosophies as to what
triggers the duty to disclose confidential, material information
under Rule lOb-5: The fiduciary theory and the information
theory. 62 Which philosophy is utilized, as evidenced by subse-
55. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 847. There were 4,300 shares involved in the
transactions. The price of the stock, on the day of the transactions, was six points less
than on the day of the announcement. A month after the announcement the stock was
selling at a price 28 points higher than the pre-announcement price. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 852. In arriving at its holding, the court was critical of the conduct of the
defendants, as is evidenced by the court's statement, "[s]uch inequities based upon une-
qual access to knowledge should not be shrugged off as inevitable in our way of life, or,
in view of the congressional concern in the area, remain uncorrected." Id.
58. See supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
59. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848 (citation omitted).
60. Id.
61. See Note, supra note 39, at 135.
62. The identification of a "fiduciary" theory and an "information" theory was put
forth by Judge Wright in Dirks v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 681 F.2d 824, 835 (D.C.
Cir. 1982), rev'd, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). The case law under § 10(b) has often resulted in
a tension between the two theories. Id. at 834-35.
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quent decisions, determines the extent of the duty.63 After
Texas Gulf Sulphur it seemed that the information theory
would dictate the extent of Rule lOb-5 liability.64 However, in
recent years, the Supreme Court has reverted to the fiduciary
theory as a guide for ascertaining the scope of the insider
trading prohibition.
4. Chiarella v. United States: A Restriction of
Rule lOb-5 Liability
In 1980, the Supreme Court took steps to narrow liability
under Rule lOb-5 in Chiarella v. United States.66 The defend-
ant in the action was a "mark-up" man for a financial
printer.67 Clients of the printer were corporations involved in
acquiring target corporations through mergers and take-
overs. 68 Because of the need for secrecy involved in such ac-
quisitions, names were omitted from the documents until the
final printing. 69 However, the defendant was able to deduce
the names of the target corporations and used the information
to purchase stock in the targets prior to the takeover an-
nouncements.70 Once the announcements of the takeovers
were made, the defendant sold the stock at a substantial
profit.7'
63. A court choosing the fiduciary theory will extend the duty only to traders in a
relationship of trust with the corporation. A person outside this relationship, but who
possesses inside information, can thus trade freely. A court choosing the information
theory will prohibit the same person from trading without disclosing. The duty will
extend to all traders with inside information whether or not they have a relationship of
trust with the corporation. Note, supra note 39, at 137-38.
64. The information theory, which emphasizes access to information and the un-
fairness inherent in information advantages guided courts in what has been deemed the
"Expansion Era" in securities fraud. See 3 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURI-
TIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD § 7.5 (1986).
65. The use of fiduciary criteria for § 10(b) liability is the hallmark of the recent
"Contraction Era" in securities fraud. Id.
66. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
67. Id. at 224.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. The defendant in the action conceded that he knew his conduct was wrong and
that he and his co-workers in the print shop were warned by their employer that actions
of this kind were improper and forbidden. Id. at 246.
71. In slightly more than 14 months the defendant realized a gain of more than
$30,000. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
THE MISAPPR OPRIA TION THEORY
The government brought a criminal action 72 against the
mark-up man, and the district court found the defendant had
violated section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.73 The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.74 The defendant
sought and was granted review by the United States Supreme
Court.
The Supreme Court reversed the convictions 75 and re-
jected the theory that mere possession of confidential, material
information created a duty to disclose under section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5.76 According to the Chiarella majority, in order
for a duty to disclose to be present there must exist a relation-
ship of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction.77
Since the defendant was not an agent, fiduciary, or one in
whom the sellers had placed their trust and confidence at the
time of the transaction, the Supreme Court held that the
printer was under no obligation to disclose his knowledge of
the impending takeovers prior to the transactions.78 His trad-
ing activities were held not to be in violation of section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5.
In Chiarella, the Supreme Court resurrected the philoso-
phy of fiduciary standards79 as a prerequisite to liability under
Rule lOb-5, and in doing so substantially limited the scope of
the Rule. However, the Court never addressed the govern-
ment's principal argument: that an employee's act of misap-
propriating an employer's confidential information in itself
constituted securities fraud.80 The Chiarella majority stated
72. The action instituted by the SEC was the first criminal action under § 10(b).
73. United States v. Chiarella, 450 F. Supp. 95, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
74. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1373 (2d Cir. 1978).
75. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 225.
76. Id. at 235. The Court pronounced, "[v]hen an allegation of fraud is based
upon nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak. We hold that a duty
to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of non-public market
information." Id.
77. Id. at 232.
78. The Court found the petitioner was a complete stranger to the sellers with
whom he dealt through the impersonal securities market. Id. at 232-33.
79. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
80. The government's principal argument was that the petitioner's secret conver-
sion of confidential material information from the corporations that retained his em-
ployer as a printing firm, and use of that information to purchase securities from
uninformed investors violated § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. Brief for Respondent at 23,
Chiarella v. United States, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1979) (No. 78-1202), rev"d, 445 U.S.
222 (1980) [hereinafter Brief].
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that it "[n]eed not decide whether this theory has merit for it
was not submitted to the jury."' 1 Thus, the Chiarella decision
left unresolved the issue of whether the conversion of confi-
dential information could constitute securities fraud.82
The Chiarella decision presented an irony. Although its
holding limited the scope of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 in
traditional insider trading cases, it provided an avenue of ex-
pansion for Rule lOb-5 liability. After Chiarella, persons who
wrongfully procurred information regarding securities became
the subject of securities fraud actions.83
III. THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
A. Origins
In its simplest form, the misappropriation theory states
that a person who buys or sells securities on the basis of mate-
rial, nonpublic information that he converted from another is
guilty of securities fraud.84 The theory has received much
support in the seven years since the Chiarella 8 5 decision as the
SEC works to bring all types of fraudulent activities within
the reach of Rule lOb-5.
The original proponent of the misappropriation theory
was Chief Justice Warren Burger. He maintained that the
jury instructions at the trial level in Chiarella properly
charged a violation of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, 86 there-
fore, he addressed the government's misappropriation theory
in his dissenting opinion. Burger asserted that irrespective of
the absence of a fiduciary relationship between the parties to a
transaction, the act of misappropriation of confidential infor-
81. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 236.
82. See Aldave, Misappropriation: A General Theory Of Liability For Trading On
Nonpublic Information, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 101, 114 (1984).
83. See infra notes 92-140 and accompanying text.
84. Aldave, supra note 82, at 114. This broad statement of the theory is criticized
as being "too imprecise to be evaluated meaningfully [as] it evades the critical question
of what constitutes the prohibited fraud." Id. See infra notes 141-64 and accompany-
ing text.
85. United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
86. Id. at 239 (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
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mation creates an absolute duty on the misappropriator to dis-
close the information before trading. 7
Chief Justice Burger's dissent noted that although tradi-
tionally there is no duty to disclose in arm's length transac-
tions,88 "the rule should give way when an informational
advantage is obtained, not by superior experience, foresight,
or industry, but by some unlawful means."8 9 Burger con-
cluded his opinion by stating that the defendant in Chiarella
had "misappropriated - stole to put it bluntly - valuable non-
public information entrusted to him in the utmost confidence.
He then exploited his ill-gotten informational advantage by
purchasing securities in the market. In my view, such con-
duct plainly violates section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5." 90
Despite the fact that the merits of the misappropriation
theory were not addressed by the majority opinion in
Chiarella, in addition to Chief Justice Burger, four other Jus-
tices indicated a willingness to accept the misappropriation
theory in some form.91 After Chiarella92 the validity of the
87. Chief Justice Burger stated he "would read § 10 (b) and rule 10 b-5 ... to mean
that a person who has misappropriated nonpublic information has an absolute duty to
disclose that information or to refrain from trading." Id. at 240.
88. Id. at 239.
89. Id. The rule that Chief Justice Burger put forth was originally contemplated by
W. Page Keeton who asserted:
[T]he way in which the buyer acquires the information which he conceals from
the vendor should be a material circumstance. The information might have been
acquired as the result of his bringing to bear a superior knowledge, intelligence,
skill or technical judgment; it might have been acquired by mere chance; or it
might have been acquired by means of some tortious action on his part .... Any
time information is acquired by an illegal act it would seem that there should be a
duty to disclose that information ....
Keeton, Fraud - Concealment and Non-Disclosure, 15 TEX. L. REV. 1, 25-26 (1936)
(emphasis added).
90. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 245.
91. See id. at 238 (Stevens, J., concurring) (reasonable arguments could be made
for the acceptance or rejection of the government's argument); Id. at 239 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (a person violates § 10(b) whenever he improperly obtains or converts to
his own benefit nonpublic information); Id. at 245-46 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(agreed substantially with Burger's dissent on § 10(b) liability and was joined by Justice
Marshall).
92. After Chiarella, the SEC promulgated Rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a),
which specifically focuses on the problem of insider trading in connection with tender
offers. The Rule mandates an obligation to disclose or refrain from trading for any
person with inside information regarding a tender offer. See Note, Securities Regula-
tion-Absent an Affirmative Duty to Disclose, Criminal Liability for Non-Disclosure Under
Rule 10b-5 Will Not Be Found, 3 WHIT-IER L. REV. 129, 149 (1981). Although the
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theory seemed apparent despite the fact that proper legal
standards for its application had yet to be established.
B. Applications of the Misappropriation Theory
Since Chiarella
Soon after the Chiarella decision, the SEC stated:
[T]he Chiarella court did not resolve whether trading
while in possession of material nonpublic market informa-
tion misappropriated or obtained or used by unlawful means
violates Rule lOb-5. The Commission continues to believe
that such conduct undermines the integrity of, and investor
confidence in, the securities markets, and that persons who
unlawfully obtain or misappropriate material nonpublic in-
formation violate Rule lOb-5 when they trade on such
information.93
The misappropriation theory has been a powerful tool for
the SEC in recent years. Despite the fact that it is a new and
innovative approach to securities fraud, the theory has been
accepted as a meritorious basis for liability under the federal
securities laws.
1. A Second Acknowledgement from the Supreme Court
The misappropriation theory received limited support
from the Supreme Court in its 1983 decision of Dirks v. Secur-
ities Exchange Commission.94 In Dirks, the defendant was a
securities analyst who was informed by a former employee of
a corporation that the corporation's assets were grossly over-
stated.95 He conducted his own investigations of the wrong-
doings, and openly discussed his findings with clients who in
turn sold their securities in the corporation.96
rule is intended to circumvent the holding of Chiarella, its effectiveness is minimal be-
cause the holding of Chiarella is not limited to tender offer situations. See Note, supra
note 38, at 1342.
93. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 17120 [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 82,646, 83,456 (1980).
94. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
95. Id. at 649. The overstated assets were a result of fraudulent corporate prac-
tices. Id.
96. Neither the petitioner nor his firm owned or traded any of the suspect corpora-
tion's stock personally, but clients and investors who received confidential information
from the petitioner liquidated securities in excess of 16 million dollars as a result of
receiving information from the petitioner. Id.
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Despite the defendant's independent efforts to expose the
scandal, the SEC censured the defendant for violation of Rule
lOb-5 because his communication of material, nonpublic in-
formation to persons he knew were likely to trade was fraudu-
lent.97  The court of appeals dismissed the petition for
review.98 However, the United States Supreme Court reversed
the decision, finding no actionable violation of Rule lOb-5 in
the defendant's conduct. 99
The Dirks decision was consistent with the Chiarella ap-
proach to limiting the scope" of Rule lOb-5 by placing fiduci-
ary requirements on the duty to disclose. 10 Nevertheless, the
decision also indicated the Supreme Court's acceptance of the
proposition that misappropriation of confidential information
is actionable under Rule lOb-5. The Dirks majority opinion
stated that the defendant did not "misappropriate or illegally
obtain the information about [the corporation]," 10 2 inferring
that had the defendant misappropriated the information at is-
sue, there would have been grounds for liability under the se-
curities laws.
2. United States v. Newman: The Second Circuit's
Resolution to the Misappropriation Theory
The majority opinion in Chiarella left the resolution of
whether the conversion of confidential information constitutes
securities fraud "wisely for another day."'' 0 3 For the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, that day came in United States v.
Newman. 10 4
In Newman, two employees of investment banking firms
representing corporations involved in takeovers conspired
with an employee of a New York brokerage firm to convey to
97. 21 S.E.C. 1401, 1407 (1981).
98. Dirks, 681 F.2d 824, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 463 U.S. 646, 652 (1983).
99. 463 U.S. at 652.
100. See supra notes 66-83 and accompanying text.
101. The Dirks action involved an insider tippee's liability under § 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5. A tippee is one who receives confidential information from an insider. See 3 A.
BROMBERG & L. LOWENFALS, supra note 64, at § 7.5. Liability for a tippee attaches
only when the insider's tip constitutes a breach of the insider's fiduciary duty. Dirks,
463 U.S. at 661.
102. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 665.
103. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 238 (Stevens, J., concurring).
104. 664 F.2d 12, 16 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
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the broker their employer's confidential information about the
identities of their client's target corporations.1 1 5 The stock-
broker enlisted the assistance of others to secretly use the con-
fidential information to purchase stock in the targets prior to
the takeovers. 0 6 After the announcement of the takeovers,
the brokers sold the stock for a profit and shared the gains
with their co-conspirators. 0 7
The defendant was indicted on securities fraud viola-
tions, 10 8 but the district court dismissed the allegations, rea-
soning that no unequivocal statement proscribing the
defendant's conduct existed in the federal securities laws to
indicate to a person of ordinary intelligence that the conduct
was unlawful. 10 9 The district court also found that the acts of
misappropriation of confidential information were not in
themselves deceptive practices violating section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5." 0
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the dismis-
sal of the indictment.'1" The court of appeals held that the
conspiracy to misappropriate the confidential information of
the investment banking firms was in itself a deceptive practice
amounting to securities fraud."' The Newman court cited
105. Id. at 15. The confidential information included plans about mergers, tender
offers, and takeover bids. Id.
106. Id. For purposes of avoiding detection, the purchases and receipts were
spread among brokers and foreign accounts. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. In addition to the allegations of securities fraud, the indictment included
charges of mail fraud and conspiracy. Id. at 14. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the district court's judgment as to the allegations of mail fraud and conspiracy
as well as to the securities fraud. Id. at 15.
109. United States v. Courtois [1981 Transfer Binder], Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
§ 98,024 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1981), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d
12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
110. Id.
I 11. Newman, 664 F.2d at 14.
112. Id. at 17. In reaching its decision the court relied on several federal appeals
courts' decisions in which other areas of the law have found "deceitful misappropriation
of confidential information by a fiduciary, whether described as theft, conversion, or
breach of trust, has consistently been held to be unlawful." Id. at 18. See, e.g., United
States v. Kent, 608 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1979) (it is fraud to steal oil company's maps and
well reports), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936 (1980); United States v. Girard, 601 F.2d 69
(2d Cir. 1979) (theft and sale of government information is fraud), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
871 (1979); Abbott v. United States, 239 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1956) (theft of maps and use
of mails constituted fraud); United States v. Buckner, 108 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1940)
(conversion of bondholder's money is fraud), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 669 (1940).
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Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Chiarella as persuasive au-
thority 13 and further opined,
[h]ad [the defendants] used similar deceptive practices to
mulct [their employers] of cash or securities, it could hardly
be argued that those companies had not been defrauded. By
sullying the reputations of [their] employers as safe reposito-
ries of client confidences [the defendants] . . . defrauded
those employers as surely as if they took their money. 14
Having concluded that the defendant's conduct was a de-
ceptive practice under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, the court
addressed the issue of whether such conduct was in connec-
tion with a purchase or sale of securities, 1 5 a necessary ele-
ment of securities fraud under Rule lOb-5. By establishing
that the defendant's sole purpose of the scheme was to
purchase stock in the corporations which were takeover
targets, the court asserted that the fraud was sufficiently con-
nected to a sale.116 The court also found that in a criminal
proceeding under Rule lOb-5, the requirement that the fraud
be perpetrated on a purchaser or seller was not necessary. 7
Thus, the court concluded that the defendant's conduct con-
stituted securities fraud.1 8 The Newman decision was denied
certiorari by the Supreme Court.1 9
3. Other Applications of the Misappropriation Theory
The SEC has continued to apply the misappropriation the-
ory to suspect securities market activity. In Securities & Ex-
change Commission v. Lund1 2° and Securities & Exchange
113. Newman, 664 F.2d at 17. The court analogized the conduct of the "conniv-
ers" in the case with that of the defendants in Chiarella. Id.
114. Id. (citation omitted). In addition to the harm to an employer of a missap-
propriator, the Newman court found that the conduct of the appellants harmed the
employer's clients as the stock the clients planned to purchase was "artificially inflated
through purchases by purloiners of confidential information." Id.
115. Id. at 18.
116. Id. See also infra notes 165-74 and accompanying text.
117. Newman, 664 F.2d at 17. The court noted, "[t]he district court's statement
that fraud [be] perpetrated upon purchasers or sellers of securities [as] a 'requisite ele-
ment under the securities laws' is ... an overbroad and incorrect summary of the law."
Id.
118. Id. at 16.
119. Newman, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
120. 570 F. Supp. 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
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Commission v. Materia 121 the theory was successfully utilized
to sustain injunctions. In Lund, the misappropriation theory
was one of three used to impose liability on an employee of a
corporation who used the corporation's confidential informa-
tion regarding a pending joint venture to personally profit in a
securities transaction. 122  The Materia action involved a
printer using information in a manner very similar to the de-
fendant in Chiarella.123 The use of the misappropriation the-
ory resulted in an imposition of an injunction against the
defendant. 124
The most recent, and perhaps the most interesting case in-
volving the misappropriation theory is United States v. Car-
penter.125 The facts in Carpenter involve a writer for the Wall
Street Journal's "Heard on the Street" column, an influential
investment column which includes both negative and positive
information about securities.12 6 Although the column does
not include corporate inside information, it does have an effect
on the price of stock featured in the column. 27  The writer,
along with a stockbroker and other co-conspirators, utilized
the writer's advance knowledge regarding the content and
timing of the "Heard on the Street" articles and traded in se-
curities to be featured in the column. The conspirators shared
the profits realized from the trade. 1 8
121. 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985).
122. Lund, 570 F. Supp. at 1402. The two alternative theories for liability put forth
by the government to sustain the injunction were that the defendant was a tippee with a
derivative duty to disclose, and that he had a fiduciary relationship with the issuer of the
stock in which he traded. This final theory was the basis for the conviction. Id.
123. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text. The defendant in Materia was
a copy reader employed by a financial printer. He was able to deduce information re-
garding his employer's client's takeover targets in four instances and traded on the basis
of such information. Materia, 745 F.2d at 199. The Materia court found the defendant
had defrauded his employer by damaging its reputation. Id. at 201-02.
124. 745 F.2d at 200.
125. 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'g sub non. United States v. Winans, 612 F.
Supp. 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 666 (1986).
126. Winans, 612 F. Supp. at 829. -[The] column . . . is a daily market gossip
feature, which highlights a stock or group of stocks and analyzes notable volumes of
trading." Id. at 830.
127. The district court found that the column did have an impact on the securities
market, though the extent of the impact was found to be difficult to measure. Id.
128. The amount of the profits realized from the scheme was almost $690,000. Id.
at 834.
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The district court found that the Wall Street Journal's em-
ployee had misappropriated the information from his em-
ployer contrary to the policy of the Journal. 129 The district
court asserted, "[w]hat made the conduct here a fraud was
that [the employee] knew he was not supposed to leak the tim-
ing or contents of his articles or trade on that knowledge."13
The validity of the misappropriation theory was fundamental
to the conviction of the employee, as the facts present indi-
cated that there was no fiduciary relationship between the em-
ployee and the transacting parties.13 1
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the convic-
tion of the conspirators, 132 holding that section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 prohibited an employee from unlawfully misappropriat-
ing confidential, material information from his employer. 133
The court of appeals rejected the appellant's narrow interpre-
tation of Newman 134 and Materia 135 to be that the misappro-
priation theory requires a duty of confidentiality to an
employer and a third party, in order for a violation to be es-
tablished. 136 Rather, according to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals under the theory, "[i]t is sufficient that the fraud was
committed upon [the] employer." 137
129. The Wall Street Journal had a conflict of interest policy which specifically
prohibited the purchase or sale of securities based on information concerning an article
that an employee knows will appear in the Journal. The policy also prohibits an em-
ployee from disclosing the paper's future contents to anyone outside the company. Id.
at 830.
130. Id. at 842.
131. See H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 32, at 367. Since no duty to disclose was
alleged in the indictment, the decision necessarily rested upon the misappropriation the-
ory alone. Id.
132. Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1036.
133. Id. at 1034.
134. See supra notes 103-19 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 121, 123-24 and accompanying text.
136. The Carpenter court stated,
[a]ppellants read Newman and Materia and interpret the misappropriation the-
ory too narrowly. Notwithstanding the existence of corporate clients of the em-
ployers in Newman and Materia, the misappropriation theory more broadly
proscribes the conversion by 'insiders' or others of material non-public informa-
tion in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.
Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1029 (emphasis added).
137. Id. at 1032. The court found that without a doubt, the fraud and deceit of the
scheme was perpetrated upon "any person" as required by § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. Id.
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The convicted conspirators filed a certiorari petition with
the United States Supreme Court on September 15, 1986.138
The Supreme Court granted review 39 of the convictions on
December 15, 1986, despite objections from the SEC and the
Department of Justice. 40 Seven years after the Chiarella deci-
sion endorsed some version of the theory, 41 the Supreme
Court will affirmatively discuss the misappropriation theory in
United States v. Carpenter, and determine its fate as a predi-
cate for liability under the federal securities laws.
IV. CRITIQUE OF THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
A. Substantive Analysis
Clearly, the misappropriation theory is in its infancy and
is not solid law. 4 A firm endorsement of a version of the
theory which presents an analytical framework consistent
with precedent is necessary to make the theory an effective
enforcement tool to prevent fraud in the securities market.
The Supreme Court should seize the opportunity presented by
United States v. Carpenter'43 to broadly construe section 10
(b) and Rule lOb-5 as proscribing the act of misappropriation.
By clearly articulating a definitive standard for the misappro-
priation of confidential information, the Court will prevent
further abusive conduct in securities transactions by prohibit-
ing the conversion of confidential information for personal
gain.
In order to find fraud in the act of misappropriation of an
employer's confidential information, the existence of a fiduci-
ary relationship between the transacting parties is not neces-
sary. Rule lOb-5 liability predicated on a fiduciary
138. See Misappropriation Theory to be Tested in Wall Street Journal Insider Ac-
tion, 18 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1808 (Dec. 19, 1986) [hereinafter Misappropriation
Theory].
139. See Summary of Orders, 55 U.S.L.W. 3420-21 (Dec. 16, 1986).
140. See Misappropriation Theory, supra note 138, at 1808-09. A primary objection
made by the government to the Supreme Court's review of the misappropriation theory
was that the Carpenter case involved legal issues which have not received wide judicial
consideration. Id.
141. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
142. See Langevoort, supra note 33, at 1295.
143. 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'g sub nom. United States v. Winans, 612 F.
Supp. 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 666 (1986).
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relationship, as required by the Chiarella v. United States'"
decision, is applicable only to traditional insider trading cases
- ones in which a corporate insider or his tippee'45 perpe-
trates fraud upon the shareholders in breach of a corporate
duty. 146
Since fraud obtained by an act of misappropriation sub-
stantially differs from traditional insider fraud, the develop-
ment of the misappropriation theory should not be
constrained by the Chiarella doctrine. Rather, by properly fo-
cusing on the employee-employer relationship, considering
Rule lOb-5 precedent dealing with misappropriation of prop-
erty, and construing the pertinent statute and rule in a manner
which would fulfill their purpose, the misappropriation theory
becomes a logical basis for securities fraud violations.
Since its inception, the theory has been the subject of
much controversy. Its present unsettled state puts forth three
major points which require clarification: (1) what actions by
an employee constitute the fraud necessary to bring the em-
ployee's conduct within the reach of the anti-fraud statutes;
(2) how the act of misappropriation is sufficiently connected
to the purchase or sale of securities; and (3) what harm must
be sustained to make the misappropriation of confidential in-
formation actionable under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
1. Fraud on the Employer: Cases and the
Proper Standard
As noted above, section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 are consid-
ered "catch-all" provisions of the securities laws,'47 but what
they must catch is fraud. 148 From the onset, proponents of the
theory have put forth different versions, yet none have clearly
articulated exactly what conduct constitutes fraud.
144. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
145. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
146. In Winans the district court made it clear that it considered the misappropria-
tion theory a separate legal theory when it stated, "[t]he essential point is that the mis-
use of corporate inside information is not the only type of fraud that the securities laws
cover." United States v. Winans, 612 F. Supp. 827, 841 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd sub
noin. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct.
666 (1986).
147. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
148. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 226 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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Chief Justice Burger's "absolute duty" version of the the-
ory finds fraud in an employee's failure to disclose the mate-
rial information to the individual with whom the
misappropriator trades.'4 9 However, given that Burger's ver-
sion of the theory is inconsistent with the misappropriation
theory's emphasis on the employee-employer relationship, his
finding of fraud on the purchaser or seller of securities fails to
resolve why an employee's act of misappropriation constitutes
fraud on his employer.
Subsequent decisions based on the misappropriation the-
ory have not embraced the Chief Justice's "absolute duty" ap-
proach. 150 Instead, fraud has been found in the employee's
conversion and use of the employer's information for personal
gain. In United States v. Newman, 15 1 the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals chose to "spend little time on the issue of
fraud and deceit" '152 in arriving at its decision that the em-
ployee's wrongful use of his employer's confidential informa-
tion was in itself an act of deception. 15 3 A fundamental flaw of
the Newman decision is that it failed to take the critical ana-
lytical step of addressing why an employee's breach of his fi-
duciary duty to his employer constituted securities fraud.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals failed to remedy the
Newman analytical flaw in United States v. Carpenter,
although the decision does allude to a basis by which an em-
ployee's breach of his fiduciary duty should be considered
fraud. 154 The Carpenter court made it clear that the conspira-
tors used secret acts to give rise to reasonable expectations of
personal profits.' 55 Secret acts, viewed as deception on the
employer, coupled with an employee's breach of fiduciary
149. Id. at 245.
150. See Aldave, supra note 82, at 115. The reasons put forth in this source for the
rejection of Chief Justice Burger's version of the theory is that it is unconvincing and
inconsistent with precedent. Id. at 115-16. However, rejection of the Chief Justice's
view of the misappropriation theory does not necessarily imply that persons who misap-
propriate confidential information are free to use it in trading securities. Id. at 117.
151. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
152. Id. at 17.
153. Id. The court's only elaboration concerning the issue of why the appellee's
conduct was fraudulent was its statement: "[t]he wrong-doing charged against appellee
and his cohorts was not simply internal corporate mismanagement." Id.
154. See Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1031-32.
155. Id. at 1031 (emphasis added).
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duty, constitute the fraud required by section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5.
Critics of the expansion of Rule lOb-5 to cover an act of
misappropriation question the elevation of an employee's
breach of his fiduciary duty into the actionable realm of secur-
ities law.'56 Opponents of the theory assert that such conduct
is best addressed under state corporate and agency law. 5 7
However, when precedent interpreting the scope and purpose
of Rule lOb-5 is considered, the assertion that the conduct of
misappropriation is best addressed by other areas of substan-
tive law is logically rebutted.
In Santa Fe Industries Inc. v. Green, 58 the Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether a breach of a fiduciary duty
was actionable under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. In finding
that the claim was not actionable,15 9 the court put forth the
test for an actionable breach of fiduciary duty: "[a] claim of
fraud and fiduciary breach ... states a cause of acton under
any part of Rule lOb-5 only if the conduct alleged can be fairly
viewed as 'manipulative or deceptive' within the meaning of
the statute."' 160
By incorporating the Santa Fe Industries test into the mis-
appropriation theory, the requirement that fraud be based on
a fiduciary breach will be consistent with other theories of lia-
bility under Rule lOb-5. Only certain types of fiduciary
breaches will be actionable under the rule; those breaches
which present manipulation or deception.
The act of misappropriation clearly satisfies the manipula-
tion or deception requirements put forth in Santa Fe Indus-
tries. The conduct entails a secret scheme to steal valuable
corporate property in the form of information.' 6' An em-
156. Note, Trading on Confidential Information - Chiarella Takes An Encore:
United States v. Newman, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 727, 736 (1982). See generally A.
BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note 64, at § 7.5(513); Comment, The Misappro-
priation Theory: Too Much of a A Good Thing?, 17 PAC. L.J. 111, 123-27 (1985).
157. See Note, supra note 30, at 866-67. This commentator asserts that an act of
misappropriation can be properly sanctioned under state agency principles. Id.
158. 430 U.S. 462 (1977). The action involved a shareholder alleging a fraudulent
underevaluation of stock in connection with a corporate merger. Id. at 462-63.
159. Id. at 463.
160. Id. at 473-74 (emphasis added).
161. The notion that information is a form of property worthy of protection is not
new to the law. It is one rationale which has provided guidance in some situations
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ployer is deceived by the conduct of its employee who implic-
itly represents to the employer that he would not convert the
information for his own use. The employee's actions consti-
tute a deliberate portrayal of a false impression to gain per-
sonal profits. 612 Under such a scheme, there is no question
that an employer is duped into believing that he will receive
the sole and full benefits of the confidential information. 63
This type of deceptive activity should be prohibited by the se-
curities laws.
The conclusion that an employee's secret scheme to misap-
propriate confidential information from an employer is an act
of deception prohibited under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 is
consistent with other Rule lOb-5 cases discussing misappro-
priation of corporate tangibles. Prior cases have held that the
misappropriation of cash or securities is actionable under Rule
lOb-5.164  By viewing confidential information as business
property, earlier Rule lOb-5 precedent will properly control.
As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Carpenter,
''an employee's use of information obtained in a breach of a
duty of confidentiality by conduct constituting secreting, steal-
ing, and purloining constitutes chicanery and foul play, ren-
dering such conduct unlawful under section 10 (b) and Rule
1Ob-5."1 65
2. In Connection with a Purchase or Sale of Securities
In order to satisfy section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, a fraudu-
lent scheme must be sufficiently connected to the purchase or
sale of securities. Critics of the theory assert that it is flawed
arising under the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws. See generally Scott, In-
sider Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 801,
814-15 (1980).
162. See United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 47 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1942).
The court in Proctor & Gamble stated, -[t]he employee, in using the employment rela-
tionship for the express purpose of carrying out of a scheme to obtain his employer's
confidential information ... would be guilty of deliberately producing a false impression
on his employer in order to cheat him. Such conduct would constitute a positive fraud
.... " Id. at 678. (citations omitted).
163. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Banker's Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 9
(1971).
164. See id. (misappropriation of cash proceeds); Mansbach v. Prescott Ball &
Turben, 598 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1979) (conversion of bonds); United States v. Brown,
555 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1977) (conversion of stock).
165. Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1031.
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because the fraud in an employee's misappropriation of confi-
dential information is not "in connection with" a purchase or
sale of securities. 166 This criticism is based on a notion that
fraud connected with the purchase or sale of securities must
be perpetrated on a purchaser or seller of securities. However,
this specific requirement does not apply to SEC enforcement
or criminal proceedings under the anti-fraud provision. 67
Rather, the requirement that fraud be perpetrated on a
purchaser or seller of securities is a judicially created limita-
tion used to determine a plaintiff's standing to sue in a Rule
lOb-5 private action for damages.1 68 When the plain language
of Rule lOb-5 and precedent mandating a flexible construction
of the "in connection with" requirement are considered, it is
apparent that the act of misappropriation and subsequent
trading on such information satisfy the "in connection with"
requirement of the rule.
Rule lOb-5 prohibits fraudulent or deceitful acts upon any
person in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
This broad language has been interpreted to require only that
the fraud have a logical relation to the purchase or sale of any
security.
In Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty
Co., 1 69 the Supreme Court put forth the "touching the
purchase or sale" standard for the "in connection with" re-
quirement of Rule lOb-5. Under such a standard, when an
injury is a result of a deceptive theory or fraudulent practice
touching the purchase or sale of securities, the requisite nexus
between the fraud and the purchase or sale is established. 7 '
166. See, e.g., Block & Burton, Securities Litigation, 10 SEc. L.J. 350, 353-54
(1983). One problem in fitting outsider trading within Section 10(b) lies in the require-
ment that the fraud be in connection with a purchase or sale of securities. Id.
167. Newman, 664 F.2d at 17. See also supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. An implied right to a private action
for damages under § 10(b) was established in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F.
Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
169. 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
170. Id. at 12-13. The Banker's Life court stated:
[W]e do not read § 10(b) ... narrowly .... [I]t is not "limited to preserving the
integrity of the securities markets," though that purpose is included. Section 10
(b) must be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively. Since there was a
.sale' of a security and since fraud was used 'in connection with' it, there is re-
dress under § 10 (b). ...
Id. at 12. (citation omitted).
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The manner in which the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
has treated the "in connection with" requirement of the secur-
ities laws' anti-fraud provisions is consistent with the liberal
test put forth in Bankers Life. In Newman, the court rejected
a defense that the scheme of misappropriation had no connec-
tion to a purchase or sale of securities, finding rather that the
defendant's sole purpose in the misappropriation of confiden-
tial information was to purchase shares of the target corpora-
tions.' 7' By focusing on the ultimate purpose of the
fraudulent scheme, the Newman court found that the actions
of the defendant fulfilled the standard set forth in Bankers
Life.' 72
In Carpenter the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reaf-
firmed its view that the act of misappropriation satisfied the
wide breadth of the Bankers Life standard. The court stated:
"the use of the misappropriated information for the financial
benefit of the [appellant] and to the financial detriment of
those investors with whom the appellants traded supports the
conclusion that appellants' fraud was 'in connection with' the
purchase or sale of securities under section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5."'11 3 The Carpenter court further stated that "[t]he mis-
appropriated information regarding the timing and content of
certain . . . [financial] columns had no value whatsoever [to
appellants] except 'in connection with' [their] subsequent
purchase[s] [and sales] of securities." 7 4
The value of misappropriated information is not realized
until the information is utilized in a securities transaction. In-
stances of misappropriation present fraudulent activities in
which the sole purpose of the scheme is to "reap instant no-
risk profits in the stock market."'' 75 When the sole purpose of
a fraudulent scheme is to gain information to be used in a
purchase or sale of securities, the fraud goes beyond simply
the touch test of Bankers Life, and is directly connected to a
purchase or sale. Therefore, an employee's misappropriation
and use of confidential information through the vehicle of the
171. 664 F.2d at 18 (emphasis added).
172. Id.
173. Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1032.
174. Id. at 1033.
175. Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197. 203 (2d cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985).
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securities market sufficiently satisfies this requirement of Rule
lOb-5.
3. The Harm from Misappropriation
The harm perpetrated by the fraud of misappropriation is
not complete until someone is injured. 176 In an enforcement
of criminal action under Rule lOb-5, the government is not
required to establish actual economic injury incurred by se-
curities investors. Rather, the government's burden is to es-
tablish that there is potential for some injury to occur. 177
Since the act of misappropriation presents potential for two
distinct parties to suffer harm, the theory complies with the
requirements of Rule lOb-5 in enforcement and criminal
proceedings.
The primary injury which will result from an act of misap-
propriation is to the employer. When an employee secretly
converts confidential information for his own use, a firm is
deprived of its decision to maximize the value of the informa-
tion as the value of secret information is reduced upon conver-
sion. 1 78 The firm is harmed as the cost and effort committed
to keeping the information secret is wasted. Direct economic
injury may result as the act of misappropriation injures the
reputation of the firm in the business community. 79 Other
businesses requiring protection of their business information
will cease to be associated with a corporation in which there
have been acts of misappropriation by an employee.
In addition, public investors are potentially harmed by an
act of misappropriation. Although investors make independ-
ent stock investment decisions unaware of the abusive use of
confidential information by employees misappropriating infor-
176. See Aldave, supra note 82, at 120. The damage occurs and Rule lOb-5 is
violated when the misappropriator or his tippee uses the information in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security. Id.
177. United States v. Johnson, 496 F.2d 1131, 1135 (5th Cir. 1974). "'[I]t is not
necessary that the government prove that anyone was actually defrauded in order to
show a violation of [the securities laws] .. ." Id. (citation omitted).
178. See Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and
the Production of Information, 11 Sup. Cr. REV. 309 (1981) for a legal and economic
analysis of ownership rights in information.
179. The difficulty in assessing exact damages under the misappropriation theory is
discussed in Note, Rule l0b-5 Developments - Theories of Liability, 39 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 969, 981-82 (1982).
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mation, this does not mean they are unharmed by the unlaw-
ful gain or a trading advantage. 8 ° When an employee
converts confidential information in the stock market, inves-
tors are deprived of the fair market value of their
investments. ' 8'
B. Policy Analysis
The United States Supreme Court's future decision re-
garding the validity of the misappropriation theory is "likely
to establish important law regarding the definition of insider
trading. In the long run, the court's decision ... may have a
greater impact on . . .the law of insider trading than [any
recent developments].' 82 Therefore, a declaration from the
Supreme Court that the act of misappropriation is securities
fraud will have a lasting impact and serve to fulfill the pur-
poses and policies underlying the anti-fraud provisions of the
securities law.
Like constitutions and common law lines of decisions,
statutes, especially broad statutes, such as the anti-fraud pro-
visions of the Act, are not static. 8 3 Statutes can and should
reach out to solve problems as they arise, and do so in a man-
ner grounded upon principle and policy.'84 The substantive
principles supporting an endorsement of the misappropriation
theory have been put forth above, and as a matter of policy, it
is now suggested that the theory be endorsed by the Supreme
Court.
Embodied in section 10(b) of the Act is the fundamental
policy to promote "[t]he highest ethical standards ... in every
facet of the securities industry." 185 To achieve such ideals, the
scope of the Act has been construed to encompass any "ma-
180. See CONG. REC., supra note 2.
181. The victims of the fraud are ultimately the investors. See Aldave, supra note
82, at 121.
182. 19 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 85-86 (Jan. 16, 1987) (opinion of SEC Com-
missioner Joseph Grundfest).
183. Branson, supra note 25, at 287.
184. Id. at 288.
185. Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Captial Gains Bureau Inc., 375 U.S. 180. 186-
87 (1963). In Capital Gains the Supreme Court stated, -[i]t requires but littlc apprecia-
tion ... of what happened in this country during the 1920's and 1930's to realize how
essential it is that the highest ethical standards prevail in every facet of the securities
industry." Id. at 186 (citation omitted).
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nipulative and deceptive practices" which serve no useful
function. 18 6 The wrongful acquisition and subsequent trading
on the basis of confidential information has no useful function,
and therefore, as a matter of policy is an appropriate predicate
for a violation of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. An endorse-
ment of the theory will result in a more effective enforcement
campaign against insider trading, encourage legitimate busi-
ness activities while deterring fraudulent ones, and ultimately
restore investor confidence in the nation's securities markets.
1. Deterrence
Until very recently, insider trading had been a no-risk ven-
ture. The potential for immense profits, when compared to a
slim chance of criminal sanctions, traditionally was a power-
ful lure to such activity.'87 Despite the recent Wall Street ar-
rests,"' the SEC is still in need of tools to effectively deter
individuals with access to confidential information from prof-
iting illegally in the securities market.
The misappropriation theory is a necessary tool by which
the SEC can prevent the wrongful conversion of information
by anyone. It has already "provided the SEC with significant
leverage in settlement negotiations and has allowed [the Com-
mission] to extract consent decrees and [profit] disgorgement
in a variety of cases."' 189 It should be validated by the
Supreme Court as it will continue to bring illegal activity in
the securities market under control.
Many people involved in insider trading are market pro-
fessionals. In order to stop their wrongful gains, the securities
laws must put these sophisticated parties on notice that their
wrongful conduct will not be tolerated and runs the risk of
severe consequences. The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of
186. Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 201 (2d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied 471 U.S. 1053 (1985).
187. See CONG. REC., supra note 2. See also Dooley, supra note 3, at 5.
188. See New Arrests on Wall Street, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 23, 1987, at 49 [hereinafter
New Arrests].
189. Phillips & Zutz, The Insider Trading Doctrine: A Need for Legislative Repair,
13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 65, 90 (1984) (footnote omitted). "Despite recognition that the
ultimate validity of the misappropriation theory is still in doubt,.. . lower court suc-




1984,'90 which did not address the substantial elements of a
section 10(b) violation, embodied such a philosophy as it in-
creased the sanctions for illegal insider trading.' 9' The Court
should follow Congress' lead in working towards deterring fu-
ture incidences of insider trading. A failure to do so will allow
fraudulent activity to prevail at the expense of employers,
their clients and investors at large. However, even if the
Court refuses to endorse the misappropriation theory, Con-
gress may intervene as the Insider Trading Act of 1987,192
currently under review in the Senate, provides a clear statu-
tory predicate or liability under the misappropriation theory.
2. Legitimate Informational Advantages
The misappropriation theory fits neatly into the current
securities regulatory scheme. It is consistent with the notion
of fairness embodied in the Act, while it outlaws fraudulent
conduct. Properly understood and applied, it serves to pro-
hibit trading on the basis of information that an employee or
other wrongdoer converts for his own use in a deceptive
breach of fiduciary duty. There is no reason to suggest that
the theory will interfere with areas of legitimate business
activity.
There are certain types of bonafide economic activity
which justify, in limited and regulated instances, the use of
confidential information in securities transactions. Tender of-
ferors, market specialists, arbitrageurs, and institutional inves-
tors may be permitted to use inside information in connection
with their bona fide business activities.' 93 The policy for al-
lowing an exception to the insider trading prohibition for
these parties is that their activities serve the market in a legiti-
mate manner.'94 The misappropriation theory complements
the policy of allowing professionals conducting legitimate ac-
190. See Securities Exchange Act § 21(d)(2)(a). See also supra note 37 and accom-
panying text.
191. Id.
192. See D'Amato Proposes Insider Trading Bill with Definition of Insider Trading,
19 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 86 (Jan. 16, 1987).
193. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1976) (tender offeror exception); § 78(k)(b) (spe-
cialist exception); see id. at § 78(k)(a)(1)(A) - (D) (block traders exception).
194. As Senator Williams noted, a balancing of interests was behind the exception
to the insider trading prohibition in tender offer situations. He stated prior to the enact-
ment of the legislation, "I have taken extreme care ... to balance the scales equally to
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tivities certain limited informational advantages. In addition,
the misappropriation theory does not interfere with informa-
tional advantages gained through special skills, intuition, or
fortune.195 It simply prohibits a game in which an opponent
has loaded dice. 196 Therefore, when an informational advan-
tage is not gained via a bonafide activity, it will be the proper
subject of the securities laws.
3. Investor Confidence
Investor confidence in the securities market is vital to
strong and stable capital formation in the nation's economy.
Confidence in the market is a major tenet of the securities
laws. Nevertheless, the recent publicity concerning the inci-
dences of insider trading and the substantial profits that can
be realized by wrongdoers 197 is putting investor confidence at
risk. Investors currently fear that they are being deprived of
the fair value of their investments when insiders illegally use
confidential information. As a result, investment alternatives
other than the stock market may be selected and our nation's
economic growth and stability may suffer.
An endorsement of the misappropriation theory will serve
to reassure investors that the securities market is honest and
fair. It will bolster public confidence in the integrity of the
market' 98 at a time in which investor confidence is ebbing. It
will also reassure the investing public that the Supreme Court
is supporting the SEC and Congress in their efforts to prevent
securities fraud.
V. CONCLUSION
Individuals who deceptively misappropriate confidential
information from an employer and subsequently trade it for
personal profit are ingenious and conniving. They exploit po-
sitions of trust and confidence for their own personal advan-
tage. From such conduct there is no social gain.
protect the legitimate interests of the corporation, management and shareholders ..
13 CONG. REC. 854 (1967).
195. See Keeton, supra note 89, at 25.
196. See Aldave, supra note 82, at 123.
197. Net profit estimates for some inside traders have been in the millions of dol-
lars. See New Arrests, supra note 188, at 48-49.
198. See Aldave, supra note 82, at 125.
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Simply because the fraud connected with an act of misap-
propriation is not the usual type of fraud involved in insider
trading does not mean that the conduct is outside the realm of
the federal securities laws. Novel or atypical methods of fraud
should not provide immunity. The fact that there is no previ-
ously litigated action precisely on point constitutes "a tribute
to the cupidity and ingenuity of the malefactors," but should
not provide an escape from the sanctions. 199
The misappropriation theory is a proper standard by
which section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 liability can be found. It
is legally sound, consistent with precedent, and promotes the
notion of fairness sought by the federal securities laws. There-
fore, the theory is worthy of a final, affirmative endorsement
from the Supreme Court.
BARBARA J. FINIGAN
199. This point was raised by the government in its brief to the Supreme Court.
See Brief, supra note 80, at 5 1.
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